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The Crisis of German Ideology

Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich

George L. Mosse

With a critical introduction by
Steven E. Aschheim

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Preface

This book attempts to analyze the history of völkisch thought and through it to define Adolf Hitler's German revolution. It focuses upon German nationalism at its most extreme, on those who advocated völkisch ideas and on how these managed to penetrate into the population. To be sure, the curious notions analyzed in this book, and the bizarre scholars who advocated them, would have remained in well-deserved obscurity had Adolf Hitler not given völkisch thought pride of place in National Socialism. Yet Hitler would never have succeeded in demonstrating the political effectiveness of the völkisch worldview had this perception of reality not already been shared by a great many Germans.

There were no doubt National Socialists who did not see their movement mainly in narrow völkisch terms, and others for whom racism was never one of the main attractions of the movement, but all of them nevertheless supported a regime based upon völkisch thought. Moreover, völkisch thought itself did not inevitably lead to National Socialism. Many of the völkisch prophets discussed in this book were individualists and curmudgeons who never united with the like-minded to form an effective political organization, and Adolf Hitler despised them for this very reason. Still, his own nationalism was a product of völkisch thought, and he castigated the "völkisch prophets" for their politics and not for their extreme and characteristic nationalism. National Socialism was a völkisch movement.

Yet völkisch thought could have continued to vegetate on the margins of history, or it could have come to power through some other nationalist movement. As I hope to show, German conservatives during the Weimar Republic and their most important political party, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei, were deeply infected by völkisch thought. Moreover, völkisch thought, though usually aggressive or racist, could, on rare occasions grant each people its own contribution to humanity, to accept the *Volk*, not as

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A German Revolution

The search for a "third way," as an alternative to capitalism or Marxism, occupied much of German thought during the Weimar Republic. Even earlier, toward the end of the post-unification period, men had raised similar questions—in a more theoretical manner, but just as seriously. Indeed, the search for a viable "third way" was an integral part of the völkisch concern. This study, so far, has discussed the various völkisch attempts to transcend the limitations of the contemporary order of things, to penetrate into regions beyond the immediate reality. Disenchanted with the world as they found it, German thinkers attempted to find some way to raise the *Volk* above its temporal restrictions. They were determined to liberate it from the shackles of a materialistic civilization imposed by a state that callously disregarded the essentially spiritual needs of the *Volk*. The postwar era thrust the "third-way" alternative again into the foreground. Pressures were brought to bear on the nation by circumstances beyond the control of the state machinery or the national economy. Fascism and communism were gaining staunch adherents in adjoining countries and were making deep inroads in German society as well. Everywhere in Europe, fascism was based upon the urge toward a "third way," and völkisch thought here intersected with the mainstream of an international movement. What had Germany to offer that was uniquely fitted to her own requirements, that stemmed from her own historical and cultural heritage? There was the heritage of the abortive popular movement of 1848. There was the impetus that had moved generations of German thinkers to seek limited reform. Above all, there were the prophets of Germanism: Langbehn, who had proposed transforming Germans into artists, and Lagarde, who had urged the revival of the Germanic faith.

Whatever the alternatives presented by the advocates of the "third way," the underlying basis was always metaphysical. During the 1920s, intellectuals continued to view the coming German revolution primarily in spiritual terms. That the soil was prepared for a metaphysical ideal of action we have already seen. The "idealism of deeds" about which men like Eugen Diederichs and Hermann Lietz spoke constituted just such a spiritual revolution. A change in the people's attitude toward the *Volk* was more important than any concrete social reforms. While such men talked about socialism, it was not the Marxian version which they had in mind. For Moeller van den Bruck, the prophet of the "third way," German socialism was a social order forged from the union of a medieval corporatism and the cultural peculiarities of the German *Volk*. As he emphatically asserted, in condemning Marxist internationalism, "every people has its own socialism."[1] But was it not a contradiction to believe simultaneously in a revolutionary yet conservative change? By no means, as long as there was a metaphysical foundation, as long as one's doctrine of revolution did not call for *new* and *radical* social and economic reforms. Man did not advance progressively, discarding his traditions as they became useless; rather he was bound by eternal laws that had been established in the past and embodied in tradition. Or, as Moeller van den Bruck stated it, "under a German socialism we understand a corporate concept of the state and economy that might have to be instituted through revolutionary means, but which, once established, must be bound by conservative principles."[2]

How then was this revolution to come about and what were to be the fruits of its success? Moeller van den Bruck, in his famous work *The Third Reich* (1923), which he first called *The Third Way*, considered Germany to be a "new nation," as distinguished from the overripe "old nations" of the West, a nation with a mission. It was a country of the future that had not yet developed its inherent peculiarities and greatness. What it had lacked until now, a shortcoming that accounted for the failure of the recent past, Moeller van den Bruck declared, was a chiliastic ideal. The "new" Germany, he asserted, had to be fired by the *idea* of the Germanic past and of Germany's potential future greatness; it had to revive and make operative in a new age the traditions of medieval messianism.[3] Contemporary materialism, contemporary society and science, had to be discarded and the German soul must take wing and follow the unrestrained course of the *Geist*. Moeller van den Bruck even subordinated antisemitism to this ideal. Nothing must stand in the way of the development of the ideal, not even the problem of race: "Racism must not lead to a new German problem by excluding, for biological reasons, men who spiritually belong

to the race"[4]—an argument that rested on the undisputed primacy of metaphysical considerations. In a spiritual revolution all differences should be dealt with on this level; intellectual and cultural affinities were more important than biological and material differences. Moeller van den Bruck was advocating a truly spiritual revolution.

But what would it accomplish? How would it transform the present society in accordance with the requirements of the *Volk*? First, the bourgeois social and economic order would be dissolved. The nation would revert to the corporatism of the Middle Ages, with allowance for certain requirements of the modern age—such as international trade, tariffs, taxes, and a relatively large amount of public spending—factors, Moeller van den Bruck asserted, which had long ago been taken into account in the protectionist ideas of Georg Friedrich List (1789–1846).[5] The corporatist reorganization was to reap for the nation the benefits of a communal society, benefits which the bourgeoisie had not been able to provide. Embodying some aspects of socialism, the new organization would uphold the sanctity of special groupings such as guilds, estates, and orders, all of which were to be subordinated to the requirements of the *Volk* as a whole. Socially and politically, the new order was to complete the democratic changes of the nineteenth century. The citizen of the "new" Germany would participate to a greater extent in the political life of the nation and would be granted a "greater" role as an integral part of the *volonté général*. Who was to lead, who to govern? Moeller van den Bruck was vague and ambiguous on this question, asserting only that the spiritual revolution would provide the answers.[6]

Other völkisch theorists elaborated on the theme initiated and expounded by Moeller van den Bruck. The circle around Diederichs' *Die Tat* took up the cause and propounded its own variation in the form of the New Romanticism. After Diederichs' death in 1927, Eugen Rosenstock assumed the ideological leadership of this group and advocated a German revolution in terms similar to Moeller van den Bruck's. He too asserted that it was not to be a political revolution, that its essence as well as the means used to bring it about must be spiritual. It would be Germany's third great revolutionary upheaval, the first being the Lutheran schism and the second the creation of the Romantic creed. Like the others, it would be a purely spiritual phenomenon.[7] Later on, in 1929, Hans Zehrer (1899–1966), the editor of *Die Tat*, reinterpreted Rosenstock's thoughts to meet new conditions. Speaking of the revived nationalistic anti-Weimar front, he identified the German revolution with a renewal of Lutheranism and said that it might even be equated with a second Lutheran revolution.[8]

The German revolution would be democratic but not parliamentary. Völkisch thought had always been concerned with having all the people participate in the völkisch destiny and at the same time preventing the *Volk* from being atomized into political parties. Opposition to parliamentary democracy fused with the condemnation of the bourgeoisie as a class which prevented the true revolution of the *Volk*. For example, Carl Schmitt and Oswald Spengler, each in his own way, claimed that bourgeois parliamentary government had become a limited class institution that conducted private business by "other means." Both writers expressed the feelings of the times. Carl Schmitt especially was an able spokesman for the general consensus of "German revolutionaries." Himself a constitutional lawyer, he declared the existing parliamentary institutions insufficient as a means of providing for genuine democratic expression and demanded that a new political forum be created which would answer the needs of a mass industrial democracy. Parliaments were declared outdated organizations of nineteenth-century bourgeois liberalism; they were more pernicious than helpful, for in their tolerance of political parties they prevented the true unity of the *Volk*.[9] Moeller van den Bruck reflected a similar disenchantment when he attributed "the whole political misery of Germany" to political parties.[10]

In answer, they all advocated a modified form of Rousseau's *volonté général*. However, they limited human endeavor, denied that the masses were capable of bettering their situation, and thought of them only in terms of traditional concepts of group identity. Correspondingly, the individual members of the nation were not seen as having uniquely personal desires, but as reflecting feelings common to the whole corporate membership. Individuals were only integral parts of a fictitious "personality," the corporation, which spoke in one voice representing the interests of all.

There were many völkisch precedents for this corporate view of society, as well as the romantics' awakened consciousness of the needs of the amorphous populace. Nineteenth-century German legal theory, dating from Hegel, had placed a corporate structure midway between society and the state, thus freeing the latter from direct involvement in personal and special interests. The corporation, basic to the organic state, permitted the uninhibited flow of life and ideas from the popular substrata to the government above. As the corporate structure, if it were to speak for the interests of all, had to settle all disagreements among its members, it left the state to exercise only spiritual guidance. Thus there was no need for representative bodies. Since the corporate bodies of the various interests and occupations of the population could be their own spokesmen, no

other organ was necessary; parties could be dispensed with and parliaments became superfluous.[11]

But before the revolutionaries of "the third way" could fully accept the notion of the corporate structure, an improvement had to be made in the theory to bring the several corporations into line with the needs of völkisch unity. Grouping around special occupational interests was good so long as an internal unity could be provided that transcended the limitations of the various interests. A mythos and a national leader were required. The youth groups and the *Bünde* led the way in pressing this demand. At the same time, they offered the ideological solution in the form of the principles of their own organizations: Eros and concepts of leadership. Here was a concrete effort to resolve the problem. The *Bund*, as we have described it, was thought to represent a living form, a true forerunner of the organic community. It transcended the corporate structure without really abolishing it by providing an over-all unity through its völkisch precepts and the concept of Eros. Through these unifying factors, in addition to its concepts of leadership, it claimed to facilitate the ideological consensus of the corporate, or *bündisch*, organization by uniting body, soul, and the spirit of all in the service of the *Volk*. In the interest of leadership, the corporate unity envisaged by the advocates of the *Bünde* system would not tolerate equality among individuals. Instead, individuals occupied places in hierarchical orders according to merit. In this manner, the corporate aspects of the *bündisch* plan merged special occupational interests with the principles of local leadership by means of charismatic leaders as they would arise in each corporate organization. Confident of their destiny, the several *Bünde*, the Freischaar, the Neue Pfadfinder, and the Jungdeutsche Orden could declare: "Where a *Bund* exists, a new Germany starts!"[12]

The *bündisch* version of "the third way" was favorably received. It did indeed provide a middle course between capitalism and Marxism, for, as the German revolutionaries exclaimed, "true socialism is the community of the *Volk*."[13] That the theory contained ambiguities about how it could actually be put into practice, and that it had not been thoroughly analyzed, did not seem to matter. They were satisfied with the broad, over-all skeleton of the theory as it steered between capitalism (denying the metaphysical sanctity of private property) and Marxism (refuting the primacy of the proletariat and class needs in the coming revolution). The aim was to rejuvenate the spiritual orientation of Germans along the lines of nature, the German heritage, and the *Volk*. Or, as such men asserted, the order of creation demanded "first a new human being and then a new state,"[14] first the spiritual transformation and then its material implementation.

Although the völkisch movement as a whole received the *bündisch* proposals favorably, there were men who looked at them with a more critical eye. For these, the concept of a strong leadership conflicted with the general idea of corporate interests. While, on the one hand, the corporate structure served the purpose of expressing the true democracy of the *Volk*, a strong national leadership would effectively demolish any such pretensions. The individual corporations and *Bünde* might, within the total structure, ably accommodate a leader without forgoing their democratic prerogatives, but a strong national leader would be at variance with such an arrangement. For, if the leadership ideal were made operative on the national scene, the whole corporate structure would become meaningless. Accordingly, these people claimed, there was a division of power inherent in the *bündisch* concept that required resolution.

Again, Carl Schmitt must be regarded as the most representative in his suggestions for resolving that division. Interestingly enough, he turned to the Italian example for inspiration and incorporated the two conflicting forces in a system of compatible responsibility and exercise of power. The corporations were to function in such a way as to make their own special contributions to a national mythos. A common bond, uniting all the various corporations regardless of their diversity, was similarly to join all the parts of the nation. This common bond was to be race: the Aryan race. The *Führerprinzip*, which would direct the united forces of the nation, crowned the whole edifice. The *Führer* would be a representative member of the race of the *Volk*, and would be greater only by virtue of his charismatic leadership. Accordingly, his concern for the nation's welfare would necessarily be greater than that of the individual corporation, which would be primarily concerned with its own interests. In this capacity he would bridge the diversity of the corporations and draw them together in a concerted national effort.[15] Thus, the leader, the corporations, and, indeed, the whole *Volk* participated in a mystical racial unity that engendered identical attitudes and values. The common denominator was found: the Aryan race.

Here again we return to the crux of the völkisch argument, of the alternative it presented: rather than stating Germany's problem in economic or social terms, the proponents of the völkisch solution thought in racial and ideological terms. We recall that they had never regarded economics as a crucial social element, and the chief place was assigned, at all times, to the spiritual disposition of the German *Volk*. Völkisch economic theory, in its aversion to anything materialistic and concrete, had never advanced beyond opposition to the international (bourgeois or Jewish)

capitalist conspiracy, on the one hand, and the international Bolshevik conspiracy, on the other. Its most sophisticated economic achievement was to define productivity as the work of skilled artisans and to condemn money and interest charges as unproductive. And this attitude, this slighting of the economic sector, was typical of all völkisch thought. The problems were never posed in real, concrete terms, but as conflicts of ideology, of identity, of spiritual values.

Though the door was closed to economic considerations, they came in by the window and in a converted ideological form played a major role in völkisch and National Socialist agitation. Many revolutionaries of "the third way" fused primitive economics with the omnipresent Germanic faith in order to direct the attack not so much against the bourgeoisie, whose capitalist inclinations it condemned, as against the Jews. In this manner the Jews were identifiable not only as a separate and alien people racially inferior to the Aryans, but also as the source of the imbalanced, pernicious capitalism that was plaguing Germany. Antisemitism could conveniently encompass the charges of racial adulteration, economic sabotage, and absolute enmity to the German *Volk*. It could also, just as conveniently, picture the Jews as the incarnation of the inferior race, as capitalism, or as Bolshevism. In short, Jewry was the corrupting force of materialism, or as Paul Krannhals (1883–1934), a völkisch philosopher, declared: "With Jewry stands or falls the mechanistic and mechanical concept of the economic system."[16]

Directed into the channels of antisemitism, the völkisch alternative of "the third way" became increasingly popular. As race became an indispensable ingredient, various individuals and organizations spurned those who lacked the proper racial emphasis. For this reason, Alfred Krebs of the DHV rejected Italian Fascism, claiming that neither Mussolini nor his party appreciated the value and centrality of race. Similarly, the National Bolsheviks, those who combined their German nationalism with admiration for the Soviet Union, were accused of ignoring or minimizing the merits of race and *Volk*.[17] The clearest example of the implications and problems of the German revolution are found in the National Socialist camp. Here the brothers Otto (1897–1974) and Gregor Strasser attempted to fight the anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist, and anti-Marxist struggle.

The Strasser brothers had been early followers of Hitler and they made it their special concern to proselytize northern Germany. By the mid-twenties Gregor was the second most powerful man in the party. Otto, the theoretician, broke with Hitler as early as 1928. Gregor remained in the party and in 1929 attempted to rally the local party leaders around

his standard in opposition to Hitler and the "Munich group" in the South. His nerve failed at the crucial moment (he did not show up at the decisive meeting) and Hitler won an easy victory. Nevertheless, Gregor remained in the party, albeit stripped of his power. Hitler's revenge came in 1934, when Gregor Strasser was murdered. Oriented toward the northern industrial regions and, especially, Berlin, the Strassers attempted to make meaningful not only the "National" but also the "Socialist" in the title of their party: to be völkisch and at the same time to present a German socialist alternative. Yet, in the end, we are back to a "spiritual revolution." On the völkisch side, they emphasized German spiritual and historical needs as well as race; on the socialist side, the communal approach to the solution of economic and social problems. The more they stressed the latter, the material implementation of socialist programs, the less emphasis was placed on völkisch ideas. Conversely, the greater the stress on the racial and spiritual aspects of the German revolution, the less attention devoted to the real issues. The two alternatives inherent in the Strassers' program were precariously balanced. But there was a subtle prejudice in favor of the spiritual even when a more concrete socialist alternative was put forward. For, upon closer analysis of the Strasser brothers' economic and social program, we find that antisemitism occupied a central position. This is consistent with the extent to which their proposed social and economic changes were to affect the real division of wealth and power. After all, even though they claimed to be revolutionaries, the Strasser brothers' reforms did not aim at abolishing private ownership of the means of production or at effecting an equitable distribution of the profits derived from the capitalist system. Their program was more "anti-capitalist"—in that it maintained that capitalist exploitation (that is, Jewish usury) had reduced Germany to economic and financial destitution—than it was pro-socialistic.

In his private utterances, in his public statements, and, above all, in the *Fourteen Theses of the German Revolution* (1929), which, after his break with Hitler, served as the manifesto and program of the factionalist Black Front, Otto Strasser clearly delineated the extent of his commitment to *socialist* social change. Here he summarized in three main points the program of his group: nationalist, against the enslavement of Germany; socialist, against the tyranny of money; völkisch, against the destruction of the German soul.[18] His first point placed him in the company of Moeller van den Bruck, for he advocated a foreign policy oriented toward the East, toward what Moeller van den Bruck had described as the territory of the "young" Russian nation. His second point demanded two basic steps:

nationalization of all land and the abolition of all unearned income, a socialist policy that left intact the core of modern industrial capitalism. And the third point was directed against the "foreign" elements that supposedly festered with the German nation: Freemasons, Catholics, and especially Jews. In the summary of his program he re-emphasized the third commitment, to "clean out" Germany, by asserting that the "fight for the German revolution is especially directed against Judaism."[19]

Since Strasser's group did effectively represent one of the more plausible alternatives to Hitler, an alternative that was seriously weighed by such people as Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher (1882–1934) in 1932, it will be fruitful to look more closely at the group's proposals. We will notice that whereas the first two proposals are rather vague and were pursued in a halfhearted manner, the third bears all the marks of dedication and conviction.

During the early 1920s, German social scientists had observed a shift in Soviet Russia away from an internationalist policy toward a concentration on national concerns. To them, and especially to some German nationalists, Russian Bolshevism had successfully combined the essential aspects of a fervent nationalism and a utilitarian socialism. The Strassers maintained close contact with the group that evolved out of such sympathies, the National Bolsheviks, many of whom were also members of the NSDAP.[20] Intrigued by the developments in the Soviet Union, the Strasser group, including, by the mid-twenties, Joseph Goebbels, considered a foreign policy that would attempt to reach a *modus vivendi* with the eastern neighbor as in the best interests of Germany's own future national socialism. But since this policy could not be implemented until the National Socialists assumed power, many aspects were left vague.[21]

The economic proposals, as they struck close to home, were subjected to a closer scrutiny and, consequently, were more detailed. Here the Strasser brothers concretized the anti-bourgeois element in the revolutionary drive and translated its anti-capitalist longing into a demand for a semi-corporatist, semi-socialist society. The former insofar as society would be organized according to skills and interests: and the latter, as it pertained to the division of property and profits.

After his break with Hitler, Otto Strasser continued to spell out the direction of thought both he and his brother had voiced within the party. Gregor, remaining a party leader, failed in his bid to depose Hitler the following year, but he still refused to join his brother, who had by then founded a new group, the Black Front. Otto Strasser denied the sanctity of private property and even advocated the complete nationalization of

land, though the farmer would retain the right to sell his produce on the free market. Yet he did not call for a greater nationalization in industry, transportation, and banking. We must remember that nationalization of land had been a common völkisch demand and that utopian groups had tried to put communal ownership into practice. In connection with the division of property and profits, Strasser's proposals were as follows: capital property was to be apportioned in such a way that the workers would hold the rights to 10 percent, the state 41 percent, and the private owners the remaining 49 percent; profits, meanwhile, were to go 49 percent to the workers and 51 percent to the owners.[22] On the whole, these were halfway measures, more in line with reform than revolution. Private property, after all, was not drastically affected, at least not the major holdings, and instead of being given greater social and political power, the workers merely received a larger fraction of the fruits of their own labors.

Only with respect to the third point did Otto Strasser's Black Front live up to its ideological claims. Here the spiritual awakening of the nation required that it be purged of all alien cultural and ideological manifestations. A reversion to the classical, the traditional German values meant a rejection of all that had caused Germany to get involved with foreign developments on the international scene. Culture, defined in its narrow Germanic application, was contrasted with civilization, the mechanistic development of the Romance countries. Correspondingly, all beliefs that had a greater than solely German relevance, such as Roman Catholicism and Freemasonry, were considered anti-Germanic and divisive. At the head of these alien influences were the Jews and Judaism. The Jews, as a people whose history and cultural development could be traced to other than German sources, were singled out as the hostile agents in all of Germany's problems.[23] Yet it is undoubtedly true that the Strassers despised the vulgar antisemitism of a man like Julius Streicher, and Gregor Strasser stated categorically that Nazis did not desire persecution of the Jews, but only a "clean division" between them and the Germans.[24] Nevertheless, even Gregor Strasser called the Jews a "people composed of cheats" and said that they had practiced usury in the time of Moses.[25] On the whole, however, it can be concluded that their more specific social program lessened the preoccupation with the Jewish menace. With the Strassers in control the German revolution might perhaps have been kept from turning into an "anti-Jewish revolution." The brothers differed from Hitler in degree, though they also accepted ideas of racial purity.

Perhaps because the völkisch ideas were so important to their program, it ended up by stressing a spiritual transformation, a recapturing of

the German soul. The attempts at social reform, important though they were, succumbed to the onslaught of the völkisch ideology. Metaphysics triumphed, for all these men were revolutionaries whose weapons lacked a concrete and practicable social and economic sharpness. They turned inward instead.

The Strassers, however, were not alone in their aspirations; others, with some of whom we have already become familiar, also shared similar goals. The idea of regenerating the corporatist structure of society, of conducting a purely spiritual and internal revolution, had adherents among those involved with the workers as well as among the higher echelons of state and society. For instance, Alfred Krebs of the DHV was joined by a fellow union leader sympathetic to the völkisch viewpoint. Max Habermann believed that Germany could attain her most "natural" form of political and economic organization only if she reverted to a corporatist state. He attempted to put his ideas into practice by entering into discussion with the Catholic trade-union movement, for he knew that many of its members were sympathetic.[26] More immediately influential, von Papen and members of his staff at a critical moment looked favorably on corporatism. In 1933, at the very moment when the Nazi-DNVP coalition government was formed, von Papen announced his sympathy with the corporatist position.[27] Of course, this did not carry with it a concomitant endorsement of social change or "third way" revolutions; rather, it was an attempt to stay the power of the fanatical nationalists, to preserve the *status quo*, and possibly to bring about a return to a non-industrial past. Edgar Jung (1894–1934), von Papen's chief theoretician, provided the most succinct analysis of the step, when he declared that the "new" Reich must be like that of the Middle Ages, that medieval society should serve as the model for constructing the organic *Volk* of the future.[28] Of course, von Papen's and Jung's beliefs did not include the völkisch desire for the union of the individual soul with the community of the *Volk*, the fusion which the DHV and other völkisch thinkers hoped would be effected by such a social order. They hoped instead for the re-establishment of the powers of the aristocracy based on heredity, tradition, and culture.

In the 1920s the advocates of the spiritualist and corporatist revolution were joined by segments of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei, which, through its economic specialist, Paul Bang, advocated the implementation of principles of corporatism in the economic field. Such a course, Bang asserted, would destroy the power of the labor unions and, in the interest of the nation, bring together the employer and the worker in industrial *Bünde*. In these, the employers, as the natural leaders, would assume the

role of *Führers*, from among whom would be chosen, again by a natural process of selection, the most competent national leader.[29]

These advocates of a revived corporatism as well as the German revolutionaries sincerely wished for a change in German society. That they failed indicates that they made a serious tactical mistake. They underestimated the resourcefulness of Hitler and the temper of the times, which demanded a more concrete, even though fanatical, program and a simpler objectification of the ideology.

But we must not succumb to the temptation of judging these men retrospectively, in the light of Hitler's later triumph. Moreover, Hitler and his immediate adherents were not without sympathy for parts of the Strasser program or even the scheme advocated by Paul Bang of the DNVP. But in all instances Hitler accepted them only on condition that they reflected his leadership-oriented ideology. Correspondingly, Hitler did not permit the development of a hierarchical *Ständestaat* (a state structured according to estates) as an alternative national system. A chamber organized according to professions or occupations, if it should exist at all, would have economic functions only. The hierarchy he devised was to be based on party membership and spiritual contributions to the betterment of the *Volk*. Men must be placed in the *Volk* structure according to their grasp of its nature and destiny, not because of their professions.[30] Moreover, economic ability was not to be equated with an equal ability in the field of national leadership; that was to be reserved for the charismatic, spiritual leader alone. This was the reason why Hitler abandoned the original *bündisch* course of the party and transformed it into a mass movement with a freewheeling leadership ideal. This change also facilitated his alliance with the bourgeoisie and the circles of high finance. In 1929, while Strasser was challenging Hitler's authority, the Nazi leader was wooing the steel barons of the Ruhr and impressing them with a very "sensible" speech.

The German revolutionaries lost out to Hitler not only because of their failure of nerve, but also because Hitler no longer needed to rely on a narrow base for the "third way" alternative. By the late 1920s he could count for support from the masses on up to the financiers and the haute bourgeoisie. Yet Hitler also embraced the idea of a German revolution and used the "third way" as well. But now what had been implicit among all the "German socialists" became explicit. Here one could have one's cake and eat it too: the revolution so many Germans desired, but one which would not disturb social or economic relationships. A spiritual revolution could be supported by all classes without fear and trembling. Indeed, by

stressing the spiritual over the economic and social realities, this was the ideal revolution for those who might have suffered under a traditional revolutionary upsurge.

Hitler took this opportunity, toward which all of völkisch history had led, and exploited it. Indeed, he drove it to its logical conclusion, for he gave it a concrete direction. Whereas the Strassers and Krebs only confused people with their halfway economic programs, and Moeller van den Bruck was vague about the "idea" Germany must attain, Hitler changed all this. The German revolution became the anti-Jewish revolution. The mass enthusiasm which over half a century of völkisch agitation had made explosive, and which, if not resolved, could become dangerous to its own creators, was shifted away from the real social and economic grievances and channeled into antisemitism. The Jew was made to bear the brunt and, although this too had been standard in the völkisch movement, Hitler made it stick.

Here then was the source of Hitler's success: his ability to transform the revolutionary longings and grievances of a large sector of the populace into an anti-Jewish revolution. Not the big capitalist or the economic middleman, but the Jew, was made the incarnation of the enemy. In his deft and ingenious distinction between Jewish and German capitalism, Hitler saved the capitalist structure of Germany from sure ruin and, in effect, preserved it. Meanwhile, the Jews were eliminated as an economic force, leaving behind their investments, inventories, and wealth. In the process they also shifted the guilt from the true source of Germany's crisis: the malfunctioning of the German capitalist structure, the lost war, and the frustrations of the past century. This is not to assert that Hitler's antisemitism was simply an opportunist device for attaining and retaining power. On the contrary, it was precisely because it was a sincerely held belief whose dynamism succeeded in holding the nation spellbound that Hitler could steer his party to victory.

The German revolution was that "idealism of deeds" which völkisch thought had always advocated. To be sure, there were similar ideas in other nations. In Belgium, for example, the fascist Rexists maintained that "every revolution has a mystical character."[31] But only in Germany had völkisch thought prepared a specific content for this mysticism which enabled Hitler to dramatize and personalize his revolution. The slogan "The Jews are our misfortune" conjured up the whole ideology which has been our concern, and the centrality of the Jew to this ideology prepared the way for Hitler's rise to power.

17

The Anti-Jewish Revolution

In the hands of Adolf Hitler the German revolution was transformed into an anti-Jewish revolution. A basic ingredient of the völkisch ideology had ripened to a point where it could be plucked by the Nazis to be successfully assimilated into their own political maneuverings and used to increase their popular appeal.

With the appearance of Hitler on the political scene, followed as it was by a successful dissemination of a whole political program, the theme of antisemitism acquired a new dimension. Although antisemitism had flourished for more than fifty years, Hitler transformed it into a political vehicle, and the soundness of his move was attested by its favorable reception by the public. Now not only were völkisch leaders lecturing on the incompatible spiritual qualities of the two peoples, and theologians of race stressing the anthropological differences, but a political leader possessing a charismatic appeal was demanding that something be done about it, that, indeed, only if the Jews were eradicated could Germany regain her lost glory and achieve greatness in the future. What was the ideological store Hitler drew upon? Who were his immediate teachers and whom did he inspire to follow in his footsteps in a society which was already thoroughly drenched with the antisemitic stereotype? It is to these questions we must now turn by directing ourselves to the mind of Hitler, his immediate antecedents, and his disciples.

Many historians, seeking the source of Hitler's anti-Jewish obsession, have turned to the writings of the "classical" antisemites or to the ideologies of such people as Guido von List and Lanz von Liebenfels, both from Vienna. But to little avail. First of all, there is no evidence that Hitler read all the literature on the subject of the *Volk* and the Jews. It is more likely

that he would listen to and be influenced by people who carried the message directly across the land and preached it at assemblies in Vienna, Linz, and other centers. And secondly, even if he did read books and journals on the subject, we do not know which ones. Thus, while he might have read Lanz von Liebenfels' *Ostara, Zeitschrift für Blonde* (*Journal for Blond People*), a notoriously racist journal, we really have no proof.[1] Therefore it seems best to give full weight to Hitler's own testimony as to the development of his fanatical hatred of the Jews. For from whatever particular sources Hitler may have imbibed his ideas in his youth, much more important is the fact that he could have gotten them from the whole range of the völkisch movement. The interesting point is how he himself considered a system of thought which was already widespread and what he eventually made of it.

Hitler traced his antisemitism to an encounter with East European Jewry. Early in his life, as he traveled from the sheltered town of Linz to the metropolis of Vienna, he experienced, he claims, a horrible fright induced by the strange, forbidding dress and appearance of such Jews. He reacted with a feeling of horror to these strange beings who were crisscrossing the land to settle down, to multiply, and to dominate, displacing the genuine Germans.[2] Consciously or unconsciously, the pages of *Mein Kampf* summarize the stereotype of the ghetto Jew as this had grown up in völkisch thought. Here was the "strangeness" which proved the existence of a Jewish world conspiracy, the lack of morality which was translated into an absence of "idealistic feeling." The Jews were not a people of culture, the soil was for them a mere object of exploitation, and lustfulness took the part of true and rooted beliefs.[3]

This view of the Jews became bound up with Hitler's hatred of Vienna itself. He loathed the city, and precisely that part of it which was most civilized excited his greatest loathing. No doubt it is at this point that his anti-urbanism became basic to his attitude toward life.[4] This took the usual völkisch forms, including the glorification of the peasant, but it focused on the Jewish stereotype.

These facets of his thought existed before the war, but it was the war experience and what followed in Munich which gave them their particular dynamic. The Jews who dominated the Räterepublik, Communists as he thought them to be, reinforced the image of the Jew as he recalled it in *Mein Kampf* from his Viennese days. Hitler became the völkisch orator only after the war, but even before the war he had contacts with völkisch groups. His life in Vienna, lived in bitter poverty, brought him these contacts. Through them he could feel himself a member of an elite, in tune

with what he called the "aristocratic precepts of nature," even while sleeping in his flophouse bunk.[5]

But Hitler's political astuteness also played an important role. He recognized the tactical value of antisemitic agitation. Later, when he himself was on the way to fulfilling his ambitions, he remembered the part that antisemitism had played in the successful career of the Viennese Lord Mayor Karl Lueger (1844–1910), and wrote of him, in *Mein Kampf*, as the "most powerful mayor of all time." But among all these factors none would seem to be a strong enough stimulus to have driven him to use antisemitism as *the* vehicle to political power. We may instead say that his hatred of the Jews was a deep emotional commitment and that its moral ingredient gave the political program just the right amount of respectability. It was not a mere tactic.

When Hitler transferred his interest to Munich and there became engaged in the intellectual life of the down-and-outers, his antisemitism also took an upward turn. In his early days of dabbling in politics, he came under the influence of Dietrich Eckart and remained close to him until Eckart's death in 1923. This important figure in the völkisch movement played the key role in crystallizing Hitler's political attitudes. At the time Hitler met him, Eckart was the publisher of *Auf Gut Deutsch*, a magazine which attracted the leading writers of the völkisch movement. Among the contributors whom Hitler is certain to have read were such men as Theodor Fritsch, Alfred Rosenberg, Ellegaard Ellerbeck, the poet of the Germanic sun religion, and Ernst Wachler, who had revived the Germanic open-air theater. On the whole the journal was marked by the overbearing presence of antisemitic articles, many of them composed by Eckart himself, while others were reprinted from Lehmann's newspaper *Deutschlands Erneuerung*.

Eckart was very influential in the development of the antisemitic dynamic within the ranks of the young Workers' party. He reinforced Hitler's abhorrence of Jews as a mysterious, strange, and conspiring people, supplementing Hitler's ideas in some areas, while creating a more fanatical foundation for their development in others. While Hitler had already shared some of Eckart's beliefs, most of them were as yet only vague, unformulated convictions. Eckart plumbed deeper and connected the removal of the Jewish menace with the resuscitation of the *Volk*. He was to make Hitler view the problem as he himself viewed it: it transcended all others in importance, and its solution would bring to an end the *Volk*'s period of trial. Or, as he stated it: "The Jewish question is the chief problem of humanity, in which, indeed, every one of its other problems is

contained. Nothing on earth could remain darkened if one could throw light on the secret of [the Jews]."[6] And in what way did the Jews achieve their domination of mankind? Eckart repeated all the völkisch ideas on this question: by depriving mankind of its sentient soul, by injecting the cold, materialistic serum of Judaism into the institutions of man, and by conspiring to assume power over the Gentile world.[7]

Eckart took himself seriously, fanatically so. Lacking any other steady source of income (except for his adaptation of *Peer Gynt* to a völkisch message in which the peasant hero portrayed a Faustian figure), Eckart devoted himself fully to distributing and collecting money for *Auf Gut Deutsch*. The publication had not been popular with the masses, and Eckart resorted to distributing it personally to commuters on crowded trains in Munich. It was especially here that he tended to push, and perhaps with reason, the antisemitic special issues.[8]

Such then was the man and party member who befriended Hitler when he joined the small body of men who then constituted the National Socialist Party. The two formed a team in which Hitler was the avid and quickly learning disciple. Eckart's tutelage proved to be indispensable in devising the tactics which the Führer later employed to gain control over the embryonic party. Thus it is indeed surprising that historians have failed to give Eckart due credit for his contribution to the viability of National Socialism. There is, of course, an explanation: historians have regarded him as too marginal, too much of a crank. But, and again we must reiterate this, in the völkisch movement he was no more marginal than Lagarde, Langbehn, or Ludwig Schemann, all of whom were equally frustrated and obsessed, and lived solely for the dissemination of what they believed to be the truth. Eckart was even more successful in that he found a disciple capable and ruthless enough to implement the faith of his master. Then, too, he introduced Hitler to Alfred Rosenberg, who in his limited and pedantic way continued the party's antisemitic momentum as an indispensable part of the ideology.

That Hitler had learned well from Eckart was shown during the party's first great internal crisis. In 1921, the six-thousand-member party was confronted with a division of emphasis: the issue was nationalism versus Gottfried Feder's (1883–1941) socialism, which consisted in putting an end to all charging of interest. Where was the stress to be placed? Hitler adroitly avoided coming to grips with the problem, a clever tactic that he followed until, having silenced the Strasser group, he could declare for a German nationalism that did not destroy the bourgeoisie or capitalist institutions. Instead, he brought up the issue of the Jews and launched

into a diatribe against their religion, race, and culture that was climaxed by the demand that force be used to counter the Jewish threat. There was no disagreement within the party: rather, the members united behind him and the separatist tendencies were buried for the time being in the enthusiasm for the anti-Jewish revolution. With this issue, Hitler had found the basis for uniting, emotionally and ideologically, the small and fanatical party, an issue which transcended the insoluble problem of nationalism versus socialism. With this issue, Hitler emerged victorious as party leader on July 29, 1921.[9]

The antisemitism embraced by Hitler was not just an opportunistic device, however, but a deeply felt conviction strengthened by a personal commitment to the whole völkisch outlook. And even though it was part of a spiritual disposition, an attitude toward life that was founded on belief in an irrational cosmology, life forces, and nature mysticism (and consequently could have been derided as the outlook of a mentally deranged person), it was real nonetheless. That these notions were real enough to have an impact on the public only indicates that the populace was relatively familiar with them, that they had existed prior to the advent of Hitler. Indeed, Hitler did not invent them; he was the direct heir of the völkisch movement. It was his strength to have grasped that the mass of Germans was highly receptive to the peculiarly völkisch antisemitic rationalizations of the nation's problems. Moreover, it is in Hitler's ability to rise above the sectarianism that had weakened the völkisch appeal that we must search for the uniqueness of the Nazi continuation of the traditional völkisch ideology. Hitler was able to translate the völkisch beliefs into a mass movement because he combined them with a pragmatic approach to politics. As he wrote in *Mein Kampf*: "A worldview can be right a thousand times, but it will be without significance for the life of the *Volk* if it does not combine with the goals of a fighting movement, a political party."[10] For Hitler all belief became political belief, but this did not abolish the ideology itself. His criticisms of the völkisch movement do not touch the basic presuppositions, but instead concentrate upon their ineffectiveness: he condemns the earlier ideologues because they were "mere wandering scholars"[11] or because they escaped into the metaphysical world of pure feeling.

The last accusation relates, once more, to Hitler's desire to make the ideology into a living reality. This meant, for him, being as clear as possible: "To be German means to have clarity."[12] How proud he is in *Mein Kampf* for boiling the ideology down to twenty-five points! He understood that one needed a clear objectification of ideas in order to activate

a mass movement. In addition, one needed discipline and organization. That Hitler was vitally interested in problems of organization is no argument that he was a mere power-seeking pragmatist. For organization, as well as propaganda, was a means to the end of translating into reality that völkisch thought which he believed to be an "inner necessity" of life. It was the combination of völkisch attitudes and a preoccupation with means in the person of a consummate politician that gave the National Socialists a dynamism and a relevance which none of the rival völkisch groups could equal. The focus upon the Jew, besides being politically useful, gave clarity to the ideology. This was precisely the combination which carried Hitler's mass movement forward to victory. Antisemitism had always been part of the völkisch attitude, and one of the most conspicuous parts. It was the combination of organization and the anti-Jewish revolution which proved so effective in Hitler's rise to power.

What had served to unite the party did similar service on the national level. The spiritual activism and fanatical dedication which the Nazi leadership brought to the theme of antisemitism appealed to the mass of German voters, from the unemployed to the industrialists and bankers. From the time Hitler made antisemitism the focal point of the party right up to his assumption of power, the German revolution was transformed into the anti-Jewish revolution. It served as a rallying point which, in its national application, provided the all too negative-sounding völkisch anti-capitalism and anti-Marxism with a positive framework. Grounded in the mysteries of race, nature, and cultural identity, the anti-Jewish revolutionaries claimed to be the defenders of Germanic creativity and not just mere preservers of the *status quo ante*. With the slogan "What is required is instinct and a will!"[13] Hitler increasingly achieved greater popularity as he directed the revolution.

Although we have stressed the overtly antisemitic aspects of the Nazi appeal as dating from the inter-party dispute of 1921, it was not until later that the theme emerged shorn of all socialist pretensions. For some time before the final victory of 1933, the program of the National Socialists still dressed up its antisemitism in national *socialist* goals. In an attempt to direct his appeal to the working masses, as Mussolini had done, Hitler supported a platform that included the "anti-capitalist longings" of Gottfried Feder's "socialism." And there is no doubt that he endorsed the "leftist" belief among the party members that the "bourgeoisie were finished" and that he raged at the betrayal of the nation by the middle class, indicting its money hunger and materialism for destroying the heroic will of the *Volk*.[14] However, this attitude became increasingly troublesome.

The leadership of the party was not at all united on the appropriateness of the anti-capitalist image the party had created for itself. Hitler gradually realized that he, like the other völkisch leaders, could expect only scant support from the industrial and class-conscious workers, for their long-time socialist tradition directed them elsewhere. There was nothing left but to ameliorate the anti-capitalist direction and retrench along the line of antisemitism. Without funds, which had to come from industrial, financial, and individual bourgeois concerns, there would be no movement, there would be no favorable election returns, there would be no German transformation, socialist or otherwise. In the end, Hitler opted for legitimacy, for the bourgeoisie and against the pernicious forces of the Jewish hydra. With this shift, the overtly anti-bourgeois emphasis slowly subsided and at best remained ambivalent.

Whereas some Jewish observers during this period attributed the rise of the National Socialist Party to despair over the economic situation, to bitterness, pessimism, and inherent longings of a growing section of the population,[15] one paper, representing the views of the Jewish university fraternities, disagreed. In its analysis it astutely recognized the essence of the anti-Marxist and anti-capitalist front. It is true, the paper acknowledged, that the Nazis were sincerely fighting Marxism and attacking profit-hungry capitalism, but they also identified both evils with the Jews. Reducing the Nazi program to its bare essentials, the paper asserted: "We, the Jews, are the enemies!"[16] The student paper was in a good position to know. Exposed as they were to constant harassment by their Gentile, German, self-styled Aryan classmates, the Jewish students were quicker than their elders to perceive the basis of Hitler's appeal among German youth. And they were correct. Youth viewed his call for the purification of all alien ingredients as its own idealistic task and readily made all necessary sacrifices in the name of it.[17]

The fears of the fraternity paper were borne out. Hitler was true to his promise not to relent on the antisemitic diatribes. They grew more extreme and became central to his program. This has been regarded as proving the psychopathic nature of the Nazi movement—not only for Hitler himself but for his followers as well. Thus a man like Julius Streicher was given free reign to express his sexual neuroses and frustrations through his obsession with the Jews. And we see still others who, acting out their primitive feelings of hate, gave in to the social urge and directed them at the Jews.[18] Of course, deep psychological disorders did underlie much of the manifestation of loyalty to the party. These disorders were real and pernicious enough but by themselves they do not explain the excesses of

the party and the implementation of the anti-Jewish programs. Though the appeal of Nazism may well have been due to its release of primitive drives by providing them satisfaction in institutionalized hatred of the Jews,[19] this is by no means the primary reason for the party's success. The psychological view of the party's dynamic antisemitism can provide clues in individual cases—or in all cases from the point of view that all of men's actions are open to psychological explanation—but we are misled if we regard it as the sole or even the primary answer, for it tends to view National Socialism as a mere aberration that resolved a specific, temporary crisis. And what is more, it would maintain that antisemitism could have been eliminated by redirecting the psychic drives of Germany's maladjusted people. But there is a greater failing inherent in the psychological interpretation: it denies the endemic nature of antisemitism and regards it as a transitory phenomenon fulfilling certain psychological needs which could have been gratified by any other minority had the Jews not existed.

It should be apparent by now that we contest the validity of this approach to the recent history of Germany. It ignores the historical, social, and ideological character of antisemitism, which, as part of the völkisch movement, had been institutionalized and provided many of the German people with a particular framework for viewing the world and man's place in it. The immense and continuing popularity of the literary works we have analyzed, the trends of thought exhibited by the painters and youth, all attest to the fact that the existence of antisemitism was not dependent upon any single crisis; rather, it permeated all national questions. Consequently, the völkisch ideology cannot be viewed as a transient phenomenon; it was a new religion whose roots, like those of all religions and faiths, not only entered man's subconscious but penetrated deeper and became a whole new way of life. In the end, these feelings became tradition itself, readily acceptable and constituting weighty evidence for the sanctity of the völkisch purpose. Hitler only promised to fulfill a concept of life which had permeated much of the nation before he ever entered the scene.

That the appeal of antisemitism was more widespread and did not depend on psychopathy for its acceptance can be seen in the way that the Jew was pictured. Whereas the image of the particular, individual Jew might be sufficient to satisfy the frustrations of a mentally disturbed person, this "individualization" would fail to achieve the desired end in a political ideology. For the image of the Jew to arouse any feelings, pro or con, he had to be generalized, abstracted, depersonalized. It is always possible for the personal, individual case to contradict a general assertion by providing living, concrete proof to the contrary. For the Jews to become

the foils of a mass movement, they had to be converted into objectified symbols so as to become other than human beings. Moreover, mass agitation demanded simplicity and consistency and consequently did not readily countenance subtle distinctions which might have excluded some Jews from condemnation. Hitler followed the path of his völkisch predecessors when he presented the Jewish evil not in its flesh-and-blood aspects but as an abstracted stereotype.

The growing abstraction of the Jew reflected the growing process of his depersonalization. Once the Jew had been denied a soul and genuine emotions, once his religion had been categorized as a fossil without ethical content, he was well on the way to being dehumanized. And who could feel any sorrow for or commiserate with an entity that had lost all human dimensions? Once a population had accepted this depiction of the Jew, it was possible to regard him as a cipher, as a figure that aroused no human compassion—only the large numbers of the martyred dead would stagger the imagination.

Hitler was greatly assisted in perpetuating this view of the Jews by the reapplication of the racial theories. Hitler himself used such theories to further the abstraction of the "Jew" and to serve as a basis for denying him his individuality. As early as 1919 he denied that antisemitism could be based upon one's feelings toward the individual Jew, unfavorable though this was bound to be. Instead, the evils for which the Jew stood were a "fact" of his race.[20] Hermann Rauschning has recalled that for Hitler "the Jew was a principle."[21] We have seen how at the turn of the century Theodor Fritsch made the identical distinction between the individual Jew and "the Jew" as an abstraction.[22] Here, once more, the völkisch tradition had prepared the way for a stereotype which transcended any concrete contact Jew and Gentile might have between them.

Purporting to be scientifically sound, racial theories built on the völkisch heritage. In this manner they had two ostensible virtues: they were "scientific" (and therefore respectable) as well as traditional. Through these ideas of race, the ideology of antisemitism was brought closer to earth, made more concrete, while the Jewish stereotype was given a more explicit objectification. We must again note here that though they pretended to be scientific, in the end these theories embraced all those features which had emerged from the romantic preoccupation with the German soul.

During the rise of Hitler, Hans F. K. Günther became the leading proponent of the doctrine of race (though after the Second World War he was "de-Nazified").[23] His books were greatly successful and before Hitler's assumption of power he was given a chair at the University of Jena, where

a more pernicious result: from now on the Nazi ideologists could determine who was and who was not a Jew simply on the basis of their own subjective judgment. And since only a few Jews existed who could objectify in their persons the racial descriptions attributed to them, the subjective criteria could be applied to all Jews regardless of appearance or cultural identity, as well as to half Jews, without the fear of popular disapproval.

This "breakdown" of the supposedly "objective" criteria of racial typology was in full agreement with the needs of the Nazis' mass movement ideology. The leadership had to retain the prerogative of deciding how and when the criteria would be applied. For there were times when it had to make exceptions to the rule in order to gain a momentary advantage, or when it had to plead an ambiguity so as not to alienate powerful sections of support. Through this development, natural to a politically centered mass movement, a pragmatic note was injected into racial criteria, though they were no less sincerely held. As the particularized stereotype of the Jew was contested in theory and reality, the advocates of a racist anthropology gravitated toward more pragmatic criteria of racial character. Now, though individuals in a race might differ, or, as Clauß would have it, "black hair and small stature could contain thin and blond souls,"[27] a more profound component set them apart from other peoples. This component could be defined in mystical terms as racial spirit, racial soul, or racial disposition, all categories that could be interpreted according to the personal or ideological inclinations of the leadership. Thus, Göring, much more cynical than Hitler, could repeat Lueger's remark: "I determine who is a Jew!" As a matter of fact, this supposed right was little used. Hitler felt differently where the Jews were concerned. When, in March 1933, the Italian ambassador, on behalf of Mussolini, urged Hitler to abandon the persecution of the Jews, the result was a "complete failure." Hitler expressed great admiration for the Duce, but in the same breath accused the Italian leader of knowing nothing about the Jewish question. Among the reasons for persevering against the Jews, such as their leadership in the Bolshevist cause, Hitler emphasized their cowardice and falsehood—components of the international Jewish psychology. Thus a threat of force against them obtained immediate results.[28]

While the scientific criteria of Jewishness became more spiritual, the spiritual antisemitism of the Nazi Party and its adherents grew increasingly corporeal. Violence and cruelty against the Jews became distinct and important parts of the mass ideology, geared as it was to the emotional expression of its revolutionary urge. Hitler advocated the application of force against the Jewish menace as early as 1921.[29] The cry "*Juda,*

the students gave him a tumultuous welcome. Concerned with the future well-being of the *Volk*, Günther made his literary debut with the publication of *Ritter, Tod und Teufel* (*The Knight, Death, and the Devil*) (1921), in which he proclaimed the advent of the heroic savior of the German nation. This book was followed by the famous *Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes* (*Racial Science of the German People*) (1922), which was reprinted fifteen times prior to 1933, and by *Rassenkunde des jüdischen Volkes* (*Racial Science of the Jewish People*) (1930). Both works showed pretensions to erudition, in the copious footnotes, the marshaling of evidence, and the careful phrasing of the text. But in spite of these trappings of objectivity, the racial images portrayed in both works made generalizations along the lines set by the prevailing Germanic ideology.

Like the völkisch racial theorists preceding him, Günther contended that the racial type objectifies the physical representation of man's inner drives and nature.[24] Thus he moved from anthropological considerations to metaphysical categories of racial beauty and soul. The racial scheme demanded a hierarchy of perfect types. Günther wisely recognized that no pure types existed: there were only less imperfect, less impure types. He placed the Aryans at the pinnacle of racial development. They were the most pure, the most beautiful, and the most creative. The lowest echelons, characteristically enough, were occupied by the Jews, who differed sharply from the Nordics. Their outward appearance, represented by slouched bodies, bent shoulders, a tendency to obesity, and thick, lustfully sensual lips, was the very opposite of the slender and statuesque German. The physical stereotype was supplemented by a catalogue of what purported to be typical Jewish gestures and traits for the purpose of documenting the Jewish preoccupation with materialism, power, and economic gain.[25]

The applicability and popularity of these racial theories was further enhanced by the controversy that developed between three rival racial theorists. In the early thirties, Günther, already well established and recognized, entered into an argument as to what constituted valid racial criteria with Ludwig Ferdinand Clauß, whose book *Die nordische Seele* (*The Nordic Soul*) (1930) held that outward appearance was not essential, though desirable, in the typing of the Aryan personality, and with Siegfried Passarge (1866–1958), whose *Das Judentum als landschaftskundliches und ethnologisches Problem* (*The Jew as a Landscape and Ethnological Problem*) (1929)[26] placed special emphasis on the environmental determinants of racial typology, repeating, typically enough, that soul-less Judaism was an urban religion. Though no single interpretation emerged victorious, the interchange, exposing the weaknesses in racial anthropology, produced

a more pernicious result: from now on the Nazi ideologists could determine who was and who was not a Jew simply on the basis of their own subjective judgment. And since only a few Jews existed who could objectify in their persons the racial descriptions attributed to them, the subjective criteria could be applied to all Jews regardless of appearance or cultural identity, as well as to half Jews, without the fear of popular disapproval.

This "breakdown" of the supposedly "objective" criteria of racial typology was in full agreement with the needs of the Nazis' mass movement ideology. The leadership had to retain the prerogative of deciding how and when the criteria would be applied. For there were times when it had to make exceptions to the rule in order to gain a momentary advantage, or when it had to plead an ambiguity so as not to alienate powerful sections of support. Through this development, natural to a politically centered mass movement, a pragmatic note was injected into racial criteria, though they were no less sincerely held. As the particularized stereotype of the Jew was contested in theory and reality, the advocates of a racist anthropology gravitated toward more pragmatic criteria of racial character. Now, though individuals in a race might differ, or, as Clauß would have it, "black hair and small stature could contain thin and blond souls,"[27] a more profound component set them apart from other peoples. This component could be defined in mystical terms as racial spirit, racial soul, or racial disposition, all categories that could be interpreted according to the personal or ideological inclinations of the leadership. Thus, Göring, much more cynical than Hitler, could repeat Lueger's remark: "I determine who is a Jew!" As a matter of fact, this supposed right was little used. Hitler felt differently where the Jews were concerned. When, in March 1933, the Italian ambassador, on behalf of Mussolini, urged Hitler to abandon the persecution of the Jews, the result was a "complete failure." Hitler expressed great admiration for the Duce, but in the same breath accused the Italian leader of knowing nothing about the Jewish question. Among the reasons for persevering against the Jews, such as their leadership in the Bolshevist cause, Hitler emphasized their cowardice and falsehood—components of the international Jewish psychology. Thus a threat of force against them obtained immediate results.[28]

While the scientific criteria of Jewishness became more spiritual, the spiritual antisemitism of the Nazi Party and its adherents grew increasingly corporeal. Violence and cruelty against the Jews became distinct and important parts of the mass ideology, geared as it was to the emotional expression of its revolutionary urge. Hitler advocated the application of force against the Jewish menace as early as 1921.[29] The cry "*Juda,*

Verrecke" ("Jews, drop dead") became commonplace. More bloody and correspondingly popular were the phrases of a verse sung by the smartly stepping SA troops as they marched through the streets: "When Jewish blood drips from the knife." In these crude slogans we can see the climax of that dehumanization of the Jews, associated with ideas of force, which we have discussed in previous chapters. The Nuremberg Laws of Jewish exclusion (1935), in their legalistic terms, also threatened violence, or punishment, against Jews for being Jews. As the Nazi government solidified its position of control, for a brief period it did attempt to settle the Jewish problem by means of legislation and encouraging Jews to emigrate. Hitler knew how to bide his time, how to exploit his captives in a multitude of ways, and how to build his program so that it could be effected with the greatest facility and with the cooperation of the population and the executioners.

Publications continued to arouse popular sentiment against the Jews throughout the land during the Third Reich. They kept alive the fire of antisemitism exactly to the degree necessary to implement measures for national ends. Pictures, films, lectures, and novels encouraged cruelty against Jews on all levels. For instance, Eher, the party's official publishing house, issued several novels in which anti-Jewish cruelty was the central theme. One of them, for example, published in 1936, glorified the murder of Walther Rathenau, while another idealized the deeds of Germanic Aryans against alien Jews.[30] *Der Stürmer*, Streicher's antisemitic sheet, published the most vitriolic attacks. It is little wonder then that when Hitler launched the campaign for the eradication of Jewry, he met with little opposition, little disillusionment in those he used for the purpose.

While it is true that the antisemitism of the Nazis had a practical intent—the elimination of the Jew as an economic and political force—it also rested its case on purely spiritual, ideological, and cultural grounds. The anti-Jewish dynamic that made itself felt in the streets, in political meetings, and in legal decrees, also made great headway through various spiritualist beliefs, theosophical religions which had a völkisch tradition, and within the body of a Germanic Christianity, as we saw in an earlier chapter. The party itself sheltered a notorious believer in spiritualistic forces. Heinrich Himmler believed in *karma* and was convinced that he was the reincarnation of Henry the Fowler. Indeed, his whole thought was saturated with the nature mysticism which has been so often discussed in these pages.[31] Nor was Hitler himself free from it. Hermann Rauschning (1887–1982) tells how Hitler occupied himself passionately with works

such as those of the nature mystic Edgar Dacqué (1878–1945).[32] Dacqué wrote of a nature somnambulism. He believed that the magical forces of nature break through in man's dreams though his culture has wrongly sublimated them. This contact with the life force, springing from nature, is the only valid introduction to the cosmos.[33] Obviously there is a connection between Hitler's reading and the New Romantic ideology. No wonder that he told Rauschning that knowledge must once again take on the characteristics of a "secret science."[34] What a contrast the supposed Jewish materialism formed with such a worldview!

The theosophical impetus also grew in popularity—in the form of a positive renunciation of a Judaized Christianity and the adoption of a purely Germanic faith. Many Nazis embraced these variations of earlier völkisch precepts and turned toward sun worship. In its most palpable form, however, this trend attempted to link itself to Germanic Christianity and even presumed, as in Artur Dinter's (1876–1948) attempt in 1927, to effect the "completion of the Protestant Reformation."[35] Dinter, the Nazi leader of Thuringia until he left the party in 1929,[36] was prominent in defining the spiritualistic basis of the new Germanic faith. His *Die Sünde wieder den Geist* (*Sin Against the Spirit*) (1921) postulated the theory that humans were only reifications of a "world of spirits" and only by striving to regain contact with the cosmic forces could they fully appreciate their racial uniqueness. In his *Die Sünde wieder die Liebe* (*Sin Against Love*) (1922), the world was described as peopled by spirits and among these the Jews were the "fallen spirits" led downward by Lucifer.[37] Thus the spiritualistic trend of the völkisch movement climaxed once more in this Nazi leader, as it had before him in such men as Langbehn and Fidus.

Even as early as *Mein Kampf* Hitler severely criticized such völkisch "religious reformers." Considering Hitler's own view of nature mysticism and the "secret science," this might seem contradictory. However, his reasons for such criticism are illuminating. The völkisch leaders in general were in his eyes "sectarians" who must be crushed by the true "movement," but specifically these reformers weakened the fight against the common enemy: Jewry. They scattered the forces that were needed to wage this battle.[38] Basically, Hitler's criticism of such men as Dinter was that they failed to focus their ideology on the Jews. This leads once more to our thesis that Hitler transformed the German revolution, of which many völkisch adherents dreamt, into an anti-Jewish revolution, and thereby concretized and objectified an ideology that had been too vague for the purposes of a mass movement.

The spiritualist and theosophical ideas were thus relegated to the background and their adherents silenced or ignored. Despite the fact that prominent members—such as Himmler, Rosenberg, Darré, and even Hitler himself—held private versions of the same beliefs, the party, in general, accepted officially only the anti-Jewish emphasis of the spiritualistic cults and Germanic Christianity.

For a time, during their rise to power and immediately afterward, the Nazi Party encouraged dissident church groups which had broken with the established churches because of racial and ideological differences. The Judaic aspects of the Christian Church came under special attack and the church dogma was indicted for its lack of a Germanic context. The Old Testament had to be discarded, while the New Testament had to be salvaged by extracting all the "foreign" elements, leaving the basic "Germanic" figures intact. Christ had to be redefined as an Aryan and the dogma had to be read with a Germanic application. Moreover, the nationalism of some of the early church reformers had to be stressed, and Luther, consequently, was regarded more as a Germanic prophet of a Nordic religion than merely the purifier of a decadent church. Among the Aryan groups which advocated such a revision of Christianity, the Bund für Deutsche Kirche (Bund for a German Church) gained early prominence and received support from the Nazi Party during its struggle with the established churches. However, the party soon found itself saddled with a possible liability, and when it started to patch up the rift with the Catholics and Protestants, it withdrew its support from the Bund.

The antisemitic impetus of the early party and the official antisemitism of the Third Reich was more pernicious when it entered into the dogma of the established churches. Many ecclesiastics, both Protestant and Catholic, felt a personal allegiance to the party, the state, and the Germanic ideology and openly voiced their convictions from the pulpit. Others believed that the German task, like that of the Holy Crusade, could be accommodated within the Christian dogma. Still others saw in the Nazi victory a revitalization of the German spirit and were grateful to the party, its ideology, and its leaders. Wilhelm Niemöller, a man of high intelligence, soon to become a leader in the Protestant resistance, has recalled with considerable frankness what May Day 1933 meant to him: then, with the Nazis in office and Germany sure of becoming a true *Volksgemeinschaft* (community of the *Volk*), that day became "a day of joy, a day which aroused new hopes."[39] Throughout the country many congregations, devout Catholics and Protestants, joined the festivities, marched alongside the proudly victorious Nazi troops, and saw no conflict between their faiths and the Nazi

ideology. With a few exceptions, among which the Dahlemer Pfarrernotbund (Dahlem Emergency Association of Ministers), organized by Martin Niemöller in 1934, was the most prominent, the congregations accepted the state directive that a Jew, regardless of his conversion or baptism into another faith, remained a Jew. That this effectively denied the validity of the sacrament of baptism did not prevent its acceptance by many a diocese.

Personally and as the leader of the state, Hitler attempted to extricate himself from direct conflict with the churches—especially the Catholic Church, whose Concordat had done so much for his prestige—and believed that, in the last resort, the religion of the *Volk* would triumph over Christianity. Thus Hitler's own declarations, made after his seizure of power, that he would not interfere with the Protestant and Catholic churches, but wished them well, must be taken as a tactical maneuver. For he proceeded to seek control over the Protestant Church and the attacks upon the Catholic Church, which increased as time went on, were not stopped. However, neither of the churches opposed him during his first year in power, for they still believed in his promises.[40] Not until 1934 did some resistance start, but never did the vast majority of the clergy join in. It is important to note the lack of resistance to Hitler during the first year: opposition to the ideology and what it stood for was apparently not strong enough by itself to produce protests against a regime committed to antisemitic and völkisch action. For some churchmen Hitler meant the end of chaos and the avoidance of a possible civil war, to others a bulwark against leftism, and to still others the mystical nature of the völkisch ideology would make believing respectable again and fill the churches.

But where Hitler abstained from direct interference except when it was necessary in the interests of the state, men such as Himmler, Rosenberg, and Darré kept alive the fires of a Nordic race-conscious Christianity. And the established churches, whether taken in by Hitler's seeming unconcern or whether they succumbed to the ideology, kept themselves alive by preaching on the civic duties of their flocks, endorsing peace and order and the observance of the nation's "laws," and by marching side by side with the men of the various Nazi Party organizations, absolving their transgressions, and appeasing their consciences.

To whom, then, did this anti-Jewish revolution, the de-Semitized Christianity, and the active anti-Jewish programs appeal? On one level, it appealed to a large percentage of the German population; on another level, it appealed to a bourgeois sentiment which was shared by most people regardless of class: obedience to the state. Many people overlooked Nazi and völkisch excesses because they regarded the rest of the ideology as

pragmatic and respectable. And so it was, or at least purported to be. Bourgeois respectability and traditionalism were successfully woven into the ideological fabric of the Nazis, who, upon assuming power, took to championing the völkisch concepts of rootedness, puritan morality, and bourgeois tastes, ethics, and values. Professor Hans Neumann stated the case well when he spoke at the ceremony, in May 1933, of the burning of "degenerate literature": "We want a literature which treats as holy the pious bonds of family, *Heimat*, *Volk*, and blood, indeed, all the revered bonds [which bind men together]."[41] Hitler's revolution did not envisage the destruction of traditional personal bonds, just as he did not contemplate revolutionizing the capitalist economic structure.

By 1934 the Nazis had eliminated the extremists within the völkisch movement and within their own ranks. All things offensive to bourgeois ethics were rooted out of the party. The sexual license of some of the völkisch groups and the early National Socialists was abolished. Nude bathing, introduced by the Youth Movement, which had become somewhat popular as a reaffirmation of naturalness and genuineness, offended bourgeois sensibilities, and Göring had it outlawed in Prussia soon after the Nazis came to power.[42] Similarly, the *Bünde*, whose principles of Eros and male companionship Hitler had fought against early in his party career, were dissolved. Thus we might say that, from both a völkisch and a radically National Socialist point of view, the Nazi Party had tailored the Germanic ideology to bourgeois standards.

From the moment when the Jew was designated as the enemy of the party and the *Volk*, the bourgeoisie were saved from a social and economic revolution, and in fact were actively brought into the transformation of the nation. They could proudly share in what Hitler, in 1933, proclaimed the "greatest Germanic racial revolution in world history."[43] Indeed, it was the bourgeoisie whom Hitler exhorted to become more courageous, to transcend their bourgeois limitations, and to fight against Jewish capital and Jewish communism. The revolution was anti-bourgeois insofar as it was directed against the Jew; while it was anti-Communist when it attacked both the Jews and the German Marxists, linking them in the Marxist-Jewish conspiracy. In its attack on the Communists, it was supported by middle-class hates and fears, while its "anti-bourgeois" drive set up a double standard, distinguishing between native and Jewish bourgeoisie.

This double standard, by which the middle class became the executor of the revolution, is made clear by a single example. Rudolf Höss (1900–1947), the commandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp, was undoubtedly the greatest mass murderer known to history. Yet his

autobiography reveals a rather normal, pedestrian bourgeois existence. In the same breath in which he acknowledges himself a professional killer, he also describes a normal family life, tells of his kindness to children and his fondness of animals. In one passage his Jewish prisoners march to their death surrounded by flowering apple trees and the beauties of springtime. In the same passage he also gives vent to emotions, not of pity for the condemned Jews, but of concern for his own family.[44] That is just the point: the revolution was "displaced" toward the Jews and could thus protect and further bourgeois values.

The same double standard that worked in Höss was also present, if much less spectacularly, in the bourgeoisie as a whole. Adhering to their principle of the inviolability of private property when it affected their own interests, they religiously ignored this principle when Jewish property was involved. Arson was punishable by law, but when a synagogue was burned down the culprits were immune—if not commended. Thus the Nazis succeeded in fulfilling their promise to end the bourgeois reign—but only as it applied to Jews!

In the end Hitler had his German revolution. Long before, in 1920, he had outlined what sort of a revolution this was to be. Not a political revolution (for 1918 had shown what this could do in Germany), not an economic revolution (for the terrible example of Russia was before his eyes), but a "revolution of attitudes and feeling" (*Revolution der Gesinnung*).[45] Thus the Jew became the focus of the ideology, just as he had been for most of the earlier völkisch thinkers. Although some of the Nazi goals may have differed from those advocated by individuals and groups in the völkisch movement, most elements of völkisch antisemitism were a vital part of the Nazi program. In fact, many who had advocated a purely völkisch goal saw that National Socialism represented the most practical vehicle for achieving it. Many from the Youth Movement and the *Bünde* abandoned their earlier resistance and hostility and marched side by side with the brown-shirted Nazis. For these people, with their völkisch precepts, Hitler was not a stranger, not an innovator, but an adapter, a molder, who gave the prevailing völkisch theories a new edge, a more dynamic emphasis. But that edge was also dynamic enough to sweep the whole völkisch movement into the shadow of the Nazi Party. Hitler's revolution, then, found large segments of the population ready for his message; and though that message may seem to us outlandish, best studied by psychologists, this was not how the admiring crowds regarded their leader, nor how historians must deal with National Socialism in retrospect.

Conclusion

In our time two major revolutionary movements have made their mark upon Europe: the Marxist and the fascist. Like Marxism, fascism spread throughout Europe, and the various fascisms shared common elements, deriving from a commonly felt need to transcend a banal bourgeois world. All fascisms attempted to capture and direct bourgeois dissatisfaction with existing industrial and political reality, a dissatisfaction which began to take a concrete revolutionary form late in the nineteenth century. At that time, youth in particular attempted to escape from the "materialist" society in which they had been reared, and tried to find a new meaning in life, a new dynamic which would enable them to recapture their own individuality. On one level this revolt led to a battle against conventions, but on another it attempted to find a new sense of "belonging" that might be combined with the revolt to which they were committed. Fascism was far from being purely nihilistic; indeed, the discovery of a positive ideology was what enabled some fascists to succeed while their more "negative" ideological *confrères* failed.

In this book we have tried to analyze the kind of identity which this revolt achieved in Germany. The flight from reality which was the final result of the crisis of German ideology took a specific form in that nation, although the same urge can also be found in all the fascisms of western Europe. By realizing the extent to which German fascism differed from the rest, even on this level, we can understand the uniqueness of the movement of thought which led toward National Socialism. This is not to deny that all fascisms had certain features in common. Fascists everywhere spurned existing social and economic systems in favor of an irrational worldview which sought both individuality and belonging at a new level.

43. August Winnig, *Der weite Weg* (Hamburg, 1932), 392.

44. Ibid., 228; Ciller, *Vorläufer des Nationalsozialismus*, 129.

45. Cited in Ciller, *Vorläufer des Nationalsozialismus*, 129.

46. At least Winnig was close to the *Bünde*. Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf, *Linke Leute von Rechts* (Stuttgart, 1960), 211.

47. August Winnig, *Aus zwanzig Jahren* (Hamburg, 1951), 124; Herbert Böhme, *Bekenntnis eines freien Mannes* (Munich, 1960), 81, 183.

48. August Winnig, *Das Reich als Republik* (Stuttgart, 1929), 286.

49. *Deutsche Handelswacht*, 38 Jahrg., no. 2 (January 25, 1931), 31.

50. For his career, see Winnig, *Aus zwanzig Jahren*.

Chapter 15. From Bourgeois to Anti-Bourgeois Youth

1. Friedrich Glum, *Der Nationalsozialismus* (Munich, 1962), 157.

2. Order of November 8, 1920.

3. *Mitteilungen*, 29 Jahrg., no. 5 (March 3, 1919), 39; Adam Röder in the *C. V. Zeitung*, 5 Jahrg. (March 5, 1926), 122. See also Siegfried Bernfeld's opinion that schoolteachers were totally committed to the right in a "crushing majority": *Das Tagebuch*, 8 Jahrg., Heft 4 (January 22, 1927), 144.

4. "Von Deutsch-Jüdischer Jugend," *C. V. Zeitung*, 2 Jahrg., no. 2 (February 19, 1926), 6.

5. Michael Muller-Claudius, *Rassenangst* (Berlin, 1920), passim.

6. See *C. V. Zeitung*, 11 Jahrg. (February 12, 1932), 57.

7. *K. C. Blätter*, 21 Jahrg. (December 1931).

8. "Von Deutsch-Jüdischer Jugend," *C. V. Zeitung*, 5 Jahrg. (February 19, 1926), 5; *C. V. Zeitung* (January 15, 1926), 26.

9. Hermann Pinnow, *Geschichte des Deutschen Volkes von 1648 bis zur Gegenwart*, 10th ed. (Leipzig, 1929), passim.

10. *Koch's Lehrbuck der Geschichte*, ed. R. Volpers, 4th ed. (Leipzig, 1927), part 4, 129.

11. E. Wilmann, *Deutsche Geschichte*, 4th ed. (Leipzig, 1930), 93.

12. Walther Gehl, *Geschichte für höhere Schulen*, 4th ed. (Breslau, 1933), Heft 4, passim.

13. "Burschenschaftliche Blätter (1928)," quoted in *K.-C. Mitteilungen*, no. 8 (July 25, 1928), 68.

14. For this controversy see Hans Schlöner, "Studentenschaft und Weimarer Republik," *Unitas* (Köln), 94 Jahrg., Heft 12 (December 1954), 14ff.

15. See the cases of Cohn in Breslau and Gumbel in Heidelberg. Also the condemnation of professorial inactivity during the antisemitic riots against Naviasky in Munich, *K.-C. Blätter*, 20 Jahrg., Heft 2 (March 1930), 19.

16. *D. St. Pressedienst*, 8 Jahrg., no. 4 (March 14, 1934), 2. By 1929 we have one estimate that 40 percent of the students were Nazi: "Vertrauliche Beilage," *K.-C. Blätter*, no. 4 (November 1, 1929), 107.

17. By early 1932, nine out of the ten "Kreisleiter" were members of the NSDAP, D. St. 71 (Bundesarchiv, Frankfurt).

18. RK Akten NSDAP, Parteien 12, Band 3, 213 (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz).

19. Ernst Buske, quoted in Jovy, "Deutsche Jugendbewegung und Nationalsozialismus," 197.

20. See Hermann Siefert, "Politische Vorstellungen und Versuche der Deutschen Freischaar," in *Lebendiger Geist*, ed. Helmut Diwald (Leiden, 1959), 180.

21. Jovy, "Deutsche Jugendbewegung und Nationalsozialismus," 142.

22. Walter Z. Laqueur, *Young Germany* (London, 1962), 134; Martin Voelkel in "Der Naumburger Bund," special issue of *Weissen Ritters*, Band 5 (Pfingsten, 1925), 33ff.

23. See Adam Ritzhaupt, *Die "Neue Schaar" in Thüringen* (Jena, 1921).

24. Jovy, "Deutsche Jugendbewegung und Nationalsozialismus," 225; conversation with F. L. Habel, October 1961.

25. Jovy, "Deutsche Jugendbewegung und Nationalsozialismus," 214; *Älterenrundbrief des Bundes Wandervögel und Kronacher*, 11 Jahrg., Heft 3–4 (April 1, 1932), 7, is typical of such criticism. See also *Freischaar*, Heft 1, Band 5 (1932), 22.

26. Winfrid-Kiel in *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, 1 Jahrg., Heft 2 (May 1930), 62.

27. On the *Bund* and leadership, see Felix Raabe, *Die bündische Jugend* (Stuttgart, 1961), 101.

28. Siefert, "Politische Vorstellung und Versuche der Deutschen Freischaar," 188.

29. Otto Michel in *Freideutsche Jugend*, 7 Jahrg., Heft 2 (February 1921), 56.

30. *Der Wanderer*, 28 Jahrg., Heft 1–2 (1933), 29.

31. Günther Ipsen in *Deutsche Freischaar*, Heft 5 (1929), 5.

32. For the ideology, see Edwin Fritz in *Der Falke*, Heft 2 (Hornung, 1931), 26; *Die Geusen*, 1 Jahrg., Heft 3–4 (March 1920), 46ff.

33. *Die Geusen*, 1 Jahrg., Heft 3–4 (May 1920), 51.

34. Karl Bösch in *Der Falke*, Heft 1 (1931), 1.

35. *Die Geusen*, 2 Jahrg., Heft 3–4 (Oster, 1921), 46.

36. Conversation with a former *Bündesführer* of the Adler und Falken in the Sudetenland, October 10, 1961.

37. Richard Bülk to Alfred Krebs (June 2, 1930), Krebs Nachlass, "Partei, privat" (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz).

Chapter 16. A German Revolution

1. Quoted in Stern, *Politics of Cultural Despair*, 258.

2. Moeller van den Bruck, *Das Dritte Reich*, ed. Hans Schwarz (Hamburg, 1931), 67.

3. Stern, *Politics of Cultural Despair*, 254.

4. Quoted in Hans-Joachim Schwierskott, *Arthur Möller van den Bruck und der revolutionäre Nationalismus in der Weimarer Republik* (Göttingen, 1962), 103.

5. See Stern, *Politics of Cultural Despair*, 258.

6. For these ideas, see Moeller van den Bruck, *Das Dritte Reich*, first published in 1923 by the Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg, which was financially controlled by the DHV.

7. Edmond Vermeille, *Doctrinaires de la Révolution Allemande* (Paris, 1948), 157–60.

8. Walter Gerhart (Waldemar Gurian) *Um des Reiches Zukunft: nationale Wiedergeburt oder politische Reaktion?* (Freiburg im Breisgaü, 1932), 152.

9. Kurt Sontheimer, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik* (Munich, 1962), 94ff.

10. Moeller van den Bruck, *Das Dritte Reich*, 5.

11. George L. Mosse, "The Corporate State and the Conservative Revolution in Weimar Germany," in Gouvernés et gouvernants, 5e partie, Période contemporaine, *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin pour l'histoire comparative des institutions*, t. 26 (Bruxelles, Editions de la Librairie Encyclopédique, 1965), 213–42.

12. See Martin Voelkel in "Der Naumburger Bund," special issue of *Weissen Ritters*, 5 Jahrg. (Pfingsten, 1925), 38.

13. See Paul Krannhals, *Organisches Weltbild* (Munich, 1936), vol. 1, 31 (first published in 1928).

14. Neue Pfadfinder quoted in Siefert, "Politische Vorstellung und Versuche der Deutschen Freischaar," 197.

15. Carl Schmitt, *Staat, Bewegung, Volk* (Hamburg, 1934), passim.

16. Krannhals, *Organisches Weltbild*, 250.

17. Alfred Krebs, "Offener Brief an Ernst Niekisch," Krebs Nachlass, "Partei, privat" (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz); Alfred Krebs, "Tagebuch," March 30, 1932, 60, Krebs Nachlass (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz).

18. "Vierzehn Thesem der Deutschen Revolution," in Wilhelm Mommsen and Günther Franz, *Die Deutschen Partei-Programme* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1931), 118.

19. Ibid., 117.

20. As to the dual allegiance, there is some evidence in Alfred Krebs, "Tagebuch" (October 17, 1930), 7, Krebs Nachlass (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz).

21. Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf, *Linke Leute von Rechts: die nationalrevolutionären Minderheiten und der Kommunismus in der Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart, 1960), 196ff.

22. Ibid., 319–20. See also Karl O. Paetel, "Otto Strasser und die 'Schwarze Front' des wahren Nationalsozialismus," *Politische Studien*, Heft 92, 8 Jahrg. (December 1957), 269–82.

23. "Vierzehn Thesem der Deutschen Revolution," 118; Otto Strasser, *Aufbau des Deutschen Sozialismus* (Prague, 1936), 77–78.

24. Otto Strasser, *Exil* (Munich, 1958), 37; Gregor Strasser, "Wesen und Ziel der Nationalsozialistischen Idee" (October 17, 1930), in Mommsen and Franz, *Die Deutschen Partei-Programme*, 130.

25. Gregor Strasser in *Völkische Beobachter*, no. 283 (December 5, 1928), n.p. See also *C. V. Zeitung*, 10 Jahrg. (October 24, 1930), 560.

26. *Deutsche Handelswacht*, 37 Jahrg., no. 21 (November 10, 1930), 415; Otto Schmidt-Hannover, *Umdenken oder Anarchie* (Göttingen, 1959), 230–31.

27. In *Der Ring*, Heft 9 (March 3, 1933), 149.

28. Edgar Jung, *Gegen die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen* (Leipzig, 1934), passim.

29. Paul Bang, *Deutsche Wirtschaftsziele* (Langensalza, 1926), 171ff.

30. Max Frauendorfer, *Der ständische Gedanke im Nationalsozialismus* (Munich, 1932), 19–24.

31. Jean Denis, *Principes Rexistes* (Brussels, 1936), 17.

Chapter 17. The Anti-Jewish Revolution

1. Wilfried Daim, *Der Mann der Hitler die Ideen gab* (Munich, 1930), differs but, to me, not convincingly.

2. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich, 1933), vol. 1, 61.

3. Ibid., 330, 339.

4. Typically enough, when, in 1937, the representative exhibition of German art was held, 40 percent of the paintings were landscapes and there were only two pictures with a factory motif. Hildegard Brenner, *Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus* (Hamburg, 1963), 112–13.

5. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, vol. 1, 69.

6. Dietrich Eckart in *Auf Gut Deutsch*, 1 Jahrg. (1919), 18.

7. For example, "Das ist der Jude!" *Auf Gut Deutsch* (Summer, 1919?). This was said to have had a circulation of 100,000. Reich, *Dietrich Eckart*, 92–93.

8. See Reich, *Dietrich Eckart*, passim.

9. Franz-Willing, *Die Hitlerbewegung*, 116.

10. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, vol. 2, 418.

11. Ibid., 395.

12. Speech at the opening of the House of German Art (1937), *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler*, trans. Norman Baynes (London, 1942), vol. 1, 587.

13. Walter Gerhart, *Um des Reiches Zukunft* (Freiburg, 1932), 99.

14. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, vol. 2, 774.

15. *Mitteilungen*, 40 Jahrg. (October 1, 1930), 3.

16. *K.-C. Blätter*, 20 Jahrg., Heft 7 (August 1930), 104. Hans-Joachim Schöps believes that a large part of the Nazi vote in 1930 came from youth who earlier had been too young to vote. It follows that the real strength of the NSDAP cannot be exclusively measured by the votes it received in the 1920s. *Rückblicke: die letzten dreißig Jahre, 1925–1955* (Berlin, 1963), 204.

17. See Erich Wolff's analysis from a Republican point of view in *Älterenrundbrief des Bundes Wandervögel und Kronacher*, 10 Jahrg., Heft 1–2 (November 1930), 17–19.

18. Winifred Martini and Hans Lamm (March 5, 1950), in Hans Lamm, "Über die innere und äussere Entwicklung des Deutschen Judentums im Dritten Reich" (inaugural dissertation, Erlangen, 1951), 97. Even so Martini puts first the völkisch direction which this dissimulation of drives took.

19. This is the thesis of Eva G. Reichmann, *Hostages of Civilization: The Social Sources of National Socialist Anti-Semitism* (London, 1950).

20. Ernst Deuerlein, "Hitler's Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr," *Viertelsjahrschrift für Zeitgeschichte*, 7 Jahrg., Heft 2 (April 1959), 203.

21. Hermann Rauschning, *Gespräche mit Hitler* (New York, 1940), 220.

22. See above, page 135. In Italy, Mussolini also found that to be successful racism has to treat the Jews as an abstraction. Renzo de Felice, *Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo* (Turin, 1961), 257.

23. As reported in *Nation Europa*, 11 Jahrg., Heft 6 (June 1961), 67.

24. Hans F. K. Günther, *Rassenkunde des Deutschen Volkes* (Munich, 1923), 19.

25. Hans F. K. Günther, *Rassenkunde des Jüdischen Volkes* (Munich, 1930), 163, 212ff.

26. Siegfried Passarge, *Das Judentum als landschaftskundliches und ethnologisches Problem* (Munich, 1929), passim.

27. L. F. Clauß, *Die nordische Seele* (Munich, 1933), 9.

28. Renzo de Felice, *Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo*, 148–49.

29. Franz-Willing, *Die Hitlerbewegung*, 87.

30. See Tüdel Weller, *Rabauken! Peter Mönkemann hat sich durch* (Munich, 1938); Hans Zöberlein, *Der Befehl des gewissens: ein Roman von den Wirren der Nachkriegszeit und der ersten Erhebung* (Munich, 1937), both published by the party publishing house. For other references, see Mosse, "Culture, Civilization and Anti-Semitism," esp. 6, for Nazi detective stories.

31. Felix Kersten, *The Kersten Memoirs* (London, n.d.), 296, 65.

32. Rauschning, *Gespräche mit Hitler*, 230. Rauschning does not mention that Dacqué is the Munich scholar to whom Hitler refers, but from the description given, there can be no doubt that *Urwelt, Sage und Menschheit* is the book in question.

33. See Otto Gmelin, "Edgar Dacque," *Die Tat*, 20 Jahrg., Heft 8 (November 1928), 589–92. Diederichs was Dacqué's publisher.

34. Rauschning, *Gespräche mit Hitler*, 40.

35. Rosenberg's *Weltkampf* criticized Dinter's "197 Thesen zur Vollendung der Revolution," but wished it, nevertheless, a wide circulation. *Weltkampf*, 4 Jahrg. (1927), 285.

36. Not only for his beliefs. Dinter was editor of the *National-Socialist* in Weimar, which was a Strasser paper.

37. Artur Dinter, *Die Sünde wieder die Liebe* (Leipzig, 1922), 79.

38. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, vol. 1, 397.

39. Wilhelm Niemöller, *Aus dem Leben eines Bekenntnis-Pfarrers* (Bielefeld, 1961), 2.

40. Guenter Lewy believes that, in part, the clergy, in cooperating, were responding to the enthusiasm of their parishioners. *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany* (New York, 1964), 43.

41. Brenner, *Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus*, 188. A semi-official publication justifies monogamy on the basis that without it there can be no research into racial genealogy and that it gets rid of animalistic sexual drives. Moreover, whoever marries into money marries into a high level of biological inheritance, for money is obtained through personal ability. Hermann Paull, *Deutsche Rassenhygiene: ein gemeinverständliches Gespräch über Vererbungslehre, Eugenik, Familie, Sippe, Rasse und Volkstum* (Görlitz, 1934), 17, 19, 20.

42. *Der Deutsche Freikörperkultur*, no. 2 (February 1934), 20, fought back in the name of "pure Germanic nudism."

43. For example, on January 30, 1933; cited in *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, January 28, 1958.

44. Rudolf Höss, *Kommandant in Auschwitz* (Stuttgart, 1958), 125, 129.

45. Deuerlein, "Hitler's Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr," 219.

Conclusion

1. Stanley G. Payne, *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford, 1961), 40, 90.

2. Jean Denis, *Principes Rexistes* (Brussels, 1936), 17, 23.

3. Marcel Déat, "Révolution Française et Révolution Allemand," *Deutschland-Frankreich*, 2 Jahrg., no. 7 (1944), 10.

4. Robert Brasillach, *Notre Avant Guerre* (Paris, 1941), 282, 283.

5. Ibid., 276.

6. Quoted in Claude Varennes, *Le Destin de Marcel Déat* (Paris, 1948), 27.

7. Marc Augier, *Götter Dämmerung, Wende und Ende einer Zeit* (Buenos Aires, 1950), 116.

8. Drieu La Rochelle, *Socialisme Fasciste* (Paris, 1934), 72.

9. Brasillach, *Notre Avant Guerre*, 189.

10. *Je Suis Partout*, 9 Jahrg., no. 381 (April 18, 1938), 1, 2.

11. Helmut Otto, *Die Flämischen und Holländischen Nationalbewegungen* (Borna, Bez. Leipzig, 1936), 79.

12. Drieu La Rochelle, *Avec Droit* (Paris, 1937), 11.

13. *L'Oeuvre* (August 24, 1937) gave much prominence to this dispute in connection with the formation of the Berlin-Rome axis.

14. Carl Gustav Jung, "Wotan" (1936), *Aufsätze zur Zeitgeschichte* (Zurich, 1946), 12.

15. Ibid., 19, 23.

16. Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (New York, 1961), 44.